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THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW REGULATING
ARBITRATION
W. Mark C. Weidemaier

Introduction
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)1 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.2
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the United States Supreme Court declared that section 2
established a “national policy favoring arbitration” applicable in state as well as federal
courts.3 Under this policy, a written arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, as a matter of federal law,” unless the agreement is invalid under state law
applicable to “contracts generally.”4 The FAA thus seeks to ensure that arbitration
agreements, like other contracts, are enforced “in accordance with their terms,”5 and it
preempts state law that conflicts with this purpose.
This bulletin discusses FAA preemption of state law and sets out the analytical steps state
courts should follow in addressing issues of FAA preemption. After briefly introducing the
1. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The FAA was enacted as the United States Arbitration Act, see Act of
February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883, codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, but is commonly
called the FAA.
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
3. 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
4. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
5. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478
(1989).
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FAA, the bulletin addresses when the Act applies,
when the Act will preempt state law, and whether
parties to arbitration agreements may “contract
around” the FAA by choosing state law to govern
their disputes. The bulletin discusses relevant North
Carolina law and identifies several areas where North
Carolina case law conflicts with the Supreme Court’s
FAA cases. The bulletin concludes with a diagram of
the preemption analysis.6

The rule allowing revocation of arbitration
agreements, however, may have had relatively
limited practical effect on early commercial practices.
Commercial arbitration – i.e., arbitration between
merchants – seems to have been commonplace in the
United States long before the passage of the FAA.10
Whether or not courts would enforce arbitration
agreements, private incentives likely ensured a high
rate of voluntary compliance. Arbitration satisfied a
need for an efficient dispute resolution system that
operated in accordance with the customs of the
relevant business community, and merchants who
disavowed their arbitration agreements might damage
on-going relationships and their reputations within
that community.11 Moreover, so long as disputes
involved merchants from the same geographic and
economic community, there may have been little
strategic advantage to forcing a trial, as neither
disputant could hope for favorable treatment from
local courts and juries.
The construction of railroads and other
technological developments, however, made
commercial relationships between geographically
dispersed merchants commonplace. As commerce
increasingly involved physically remote merchants,
private incentives created by the need to maintain
relationships and reputation in a local business
community no longer ensured that merchants would
honor their arbitration agreements.12 Distant
merchants, moreover, may have been skeptical of
local courts and juries, and in this context courts’
unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements may
have posed a more serious problem.13
Thus, the standard explanation of the FAA’s
enactment is that:

A Brief Introduction To The
Federal Arbitration Act
According to the standard account of the FAA’s
origin,7 Congress enacted the FAA “to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law
and had been adopted by American courts, and to
place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts.”8 This “longstanding judicial
hostility” was reflected in a rule allowing either party
to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement to revoke its
consent to arbitration at any time before the arbitral
award was rendered.9
6. For a thorough discussion of how to analyze FAA
preemption issues (though without emphasis on North
Carolina law or discussion of how to determine whether the
FAA applies), see Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal
Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 Id. L. J. 393 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, The Second
Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1305, 1308-12 (1985).
8. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 24 (1991) (discussing FAA after its extension to state
court proceedings).
9. See, e.g., United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad
Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (predispute arbitration agreement void); Parsons v. Ambos, 48
S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904) (“A common-law agreement,
therefore, to submit the validity and effect of a contract, or
to submit all matters in dispute, to arbitration, may be
revoked by either party at any time before the award.”);
Paulsen v. Manske, 18 N.E. 275, 278 (Ill. 1888) (“[U]ntil
an award was made the authority of the arbitrators was
subject to revocation by either party to the submission.”).
For a general discussion of the rule of revocability and an
argument for applying that rule to modern contracts of
adhesion, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The
Revocability of Contract Provisions Controlling Resolution
of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 207 (Winter/Spring 2004). See also Sarah

Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All”
Does Not Fit, 16 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 759, 760-64
(2001) (discussing origins of, and bases for judicial
hostility to, FAA).
10. See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the
Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development
of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J. L. Econ. & Organ.
479, 481-85 (1995).
11. See Cole, supra n. 9 at 760-62.
12. See id. 762 (“[A]s commerce grew beyond local
fairs to national and then international venues, the informal
marketplace sanctions that accompanied the failure to abide
by an arbitral award were no longer sufficient alone to
preserve the commercial community.”).
13. See Carrington & Castle, supra n. 9 at 215 (“After
the construction of railroads, local communitarian sanctions
no longer applied to commercial disputes, and distant
merchants mistrusted local courts.”).
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procedural statute applicable only in federal court.20
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
refused to reconsider Southland,21 and has extended
its “arbitration federalism”22 to invalidate an array of
state laws deemed hostile to arbitration.
There remains, however, some uncertainty about
the scope of FAA preemption. Moreover, the North
Carolina cases do not yield a clear analytical
approach to addressing preemption issues, and, on
occasion, have conducted preemption analyses that
are inconsistent with, and preempted by, the Supreme
Court’s FAA cases. The remainder of this bulletin
therefore suggests an analytical approach to deciding
whether the FAA preempts state law.

Confronted by hostile courts and an
expanding marketplace, the commercial
community in America turned toward
Congress to assist them in their efforts to
bypass the traditional legal system in favor
of a more efficient system of arbitration.
The passage of the FAA was an
acknowledgment that a purely private
approach was no longer workable in light of
the developing concerns about enforceability
that the market was no longer addressing
and that the courts were exacerbating.14
This historical account, however, asserts that the
FAA was merely the federal component to a struggle,
also underway at the state level, to reverse the
perceived judicial hostility to arbitration.15
According to this account, Congress intended the
FAA to be a procedural statute that would require
federal courts to specifically enforce arbitration
agreements that were valid under state law.16
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Southland
held that FAA section 2 creates a substantive rule of
law applicable in state as well as federal court.17 In
Southland, the California Supreme Court had ruled
that the FAA did not preempt state law requiring a
judicial forum for claims brought under a state statute
regulating the franchisee/franchisor relationship. In
reversing that ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court
asserted that the FAA “declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve
by arbitration.”18
Southland has been widely – though not
universally – criticized by scholars, many of whom
believe, like Justice O’Connor in her Southland
dissent,19 that Congress intended the FAA to be a

20. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Toward Changing
Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 1459,
1469 n.33 (1996) (“The Southland decision is remarkable
for its preemption holding that blatantly ignores legislative
intent.”); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract
and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 380 & n.239
(calling the Southland holding an “extraordinarily
disingenuous manipulation of the history” of the FAA, and
calling the Court’s treatment of that history “bogus”); 1 Ian
R. Macneil et al., Federal Arbitration Law: Agreements,
Awards, and Remedies under the Federal Arbitration Act §
10.2, at 10:5 (1999 Supp.) (herein “Macneil”) (calling
Southland majority opinion “painfully misleading”). But
see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland:
Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 101 (2002-2003)
(defending result reached in Southland).
21. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (declining request by twenty state
Attorneys General to overrule Southland); see also Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2001) (“The
question of Southland’s continuing vitality was given
explicit consideration in Allied-Bruce, and the Court
declined to overrule it. . . . In Allied-Bruce the Court noted
that Congress had not moved to overturn Southland, and we
now note that it has not done so in response to Allied-Bruce
itself.”) (citations omitted).
22. Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 176.

14. Cole, supra n. 9 at 763.
15. See Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter,
Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial
Arbitration, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 175, 185 (2002) (“The FAA
was to be the federal piece of the national, state-led
movement to legitimize commercial arbitration jurisdiction
by jurisdiction.”).
16. See id. at 182-86; Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331,
343 (1996).
17. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
18. See id. at 10; see also WMS, Inc. v. Weaver, 602
S.E.2d 706, 710 (N.C. App. 2004) (“The FAA preempts
conflicting state law, including state law addressing the role
of courts in reviewing arbitration awards.”).
19. See 465 U.S. at 21-36.
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Determining whether the FAA
applies to an arbitration agreement

procedural statute applicable only in federal court.27
The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the
FAA to be an exercise of Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution,28 thus
transforming the FAA from a federal procedural
statute into a substantive, “national policy favoring
arbitration” applicable in state as well as federal
courts.29 The scope of FAA section 2 therefore
depends on two questions. First, how expansive are
Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause?
Second, does the language of section 2 – referring to
“contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving
commerce” – evidence Congress’ intent to exercise
those powers to the fullest?30

Is there a written arbitration provision in
a “maritime transaction” or a “contract
evidencing a transaction involving
commerce?”
The FAA does not require courts to enforce all
agreements to arbitrate. Rather, the Act applies to
written arbitration provisions23 in two categories of
transactions. First, the Act applies to a written
arbitration provision in “any maritime transaction.”24
Second, the Act applies to a written arbitration
provision in “a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce.”25 The first step in a court’s
preemption analysis, then, is to determine whether
the parties have a written arbitration agreement in a
transaction that falls into one of these two categories.
Maritime litigation is relatively rare in state courts,26
so this bulletin focuses on contracts that “evidence[]
a transaction involving commerce.”
What types of contracts “evidenc[e] a transaction
involving commerce?” As noted above, many
believe that Congress intended the FAA to be a

The scope of Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause grants Congress power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”31
While the extent of Congress’ Commerce Clause
power, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, is
subject to debate, Congress generally has power to
regulate three categories of activity. Congress may:

23. A “written arbitration provision” need not comply
with any particular formalities, such as a signature
requirement. See, e.g., Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d
1437, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994); Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi &
Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987); see also G.S. §
1-569.6(a) & 569.1(6) (requiring enforcement of arbitration
agreements that are “contained in a record,” and defining
record to mean “information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium
and is retrievable in perceivable form”).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA defines “maritime
transaction” broadly to include “charter parties, bills of
lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage,
supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions,
or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the
subject of controversy, would be embraced within
admiralty jurisdiction.” 9 U.S.C. § 1.
25. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
26. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, federal district courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled.” Although most maritime and admiralty claims
are litigated in federal court, section 1333 “preserves
remedies and the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts over
some admiralty and maritime claims.” Lewis v. Lewis &
Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445 (2001).

•

regulate the channels of interstate commerce;

•

regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even from threats arising
from purely intrastate activities; and

27. See supra nn. 15-22 and accompanying text.
28. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (“[I]t is clear beyond dispute
that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and
confined to the incontestable federal foundations of
‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.’”).
29. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(“The basic issue . . . was the arbitrability of the dispute
between [the parties.] Federal law in the terms of the
Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal
court. . . . The effect of [§ 2] is to create a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the coverage of the Act.”).
30. The FAA defines “commerce” broadly to include
“commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the
District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory and any State or
foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any
State or Territory or foreign nation.” 9 U.S.C. § 1.
31. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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regulate activities “that substantially affect
interstate commerce.”32

Congress intended to exercise that power to the
fullest in enacting the FAA. Does the Act apply to
every transaction Congress has the power to regulate?
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, the
U.S. Supreme Court has answered this question in the
affirmative, holding that section 2 extends the FAA
“to the limits of Congress’ Commerce Clause
power.”38 This holding effectively overrules a
number of North Carolina cases that have interpreted
the FAA more narrowly.
For example, in Bryant-Durham Electric Co.,
Inc. v. Durham County Hospital Corp.,39 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that, for the FAA to
apply, “the transaction which is the subject of the
contract [containing an arbitration clause] must be a
transaction in interstate commerce.”40 Courts
typically interpret the phrase “in commerce” to
include “only persons or activities within the flow of
interstate commerce.”41 The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, has rejected this limiting interpretation of
the FAA.42 As noted previously, Congress may
regulate even purely intrastate activities under its
Commerce Clause power; it is not limited to
regulating activities “within the flow of
commerce.”43

Note that the Commerce Clause confers upon
Congress substantial authority to regulate even purely
intrastate activity. This includes the authority to
regulate an individual transaction even though the
transaction, by itself, has no substantial effect on
interstate commerce.33 For example, the “Commerce
Clause power ‘may be exercised in individual cases
without showing any specific effect upon interstate
commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic activity
in question would represent ‘a general practice . . .
subject to federal control.’”34 So, for example,
Congress may regulate local businesses that purchase
substantial quantities of goods that have moved in
interstate commerce,35 or that cater to interstate
travelers.36 Likewise, Congress may regulate the
terms of individual credit transactions where such
transactions, taken as a whole, substantially affect
interstate commerce.37

Section 2 extends the FAA to the full reach
of Congress’ power under the Commerce
Clause.
Although it has substantial power under the
Commerce Clause, the question remains whether

38. 513 U.S 265, 268 (1995).
39. 42 N.C. App. 351, 256 S.E.2d 529 (1979).
40. Id. at 356, 256 S.E.2d at 532 (holding that
construction of hospital was not an act in interstate
commerce, and rejecting argument that FAA applied
because materials used to perform contract were shipped in
interstate commerce). This holding was later disapproved
by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Burke County Pub.
Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408,
415-16 & n.9, 279 S.E.2d 816, 820-21 & n.9 (1981) (noting
that FAA may govern a contract that does not contemplate
or call for interstate shipment of goods, citing authority
consistent with that position, and listing Bryant-Durham as
a contrary case). Shaver Partnership, however, applies a
second test disapproved by the U.S. Supreme Court. See
infra n. 44.
41. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273. (quotation omitted);
see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S.
186, 195 (1974) (referring to the term “in commerce” in the
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act: “the distinct ‘in
commerce’ language . . . appears to denote only persons or
activities within the flow of interstate commerce – the
practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods
and services for interstate markets and their transport and
distribution to the consumer.”).
42. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 268.
43. See Sillins v. Ness, 164 N.C. App. 755, 760, 596
S.E.2d 874, 877 (2004) (recognizing that FAA’s use of

32. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005);
U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); U.S. v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
33. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52,
56-57 (2003) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 56-57 (quoting Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948) (emphasis added). Until Gonzales v. Raich, the
Court’s more recent Commerce Clause cases had suggested
that Congress’ power to regulate intrastate activity based on
its aggregate effect on commerce is limited to intrastate
economic activity. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61;
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611. Raich, however, arguably
recognizes a broader Congressional power by adopting an
expansive definition of “economic activity” – one that
included, in Raich, the noncommercial, intrastate
possession and use of marijuana for medical purposes.
35. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05
(1964).
36. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 250-51, 258 (1964).
37. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971);
see also Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 58 (Congress may
regulate commercial lending given that activity’s “broad
impact . . . on the national economy”).
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In another limiting interpretation of FAA section
2, some North Carolina cases have held that a
contract will “evidenc[e] a transaction involving
commerce” if, “at the time [the parties] entered into
[the contract] and accepted the arbitration clause,
they contemplated substantial interstate activity.”44
Under this interpretation, whether the FAA applies
depends on the parties’ expectations when they
entered their contract. In Allied-Bruce, however, the
Supreme Court expressly rejected the “contemplation
of the parties” test, holding instead that the FAA will
apply whenever the parties’ transaction “turn[s] out,
in fact, to have involved interstate commerce.”45 As
a result, North Carolina cases applying the
“contemplation of the parties” test – some of which
were decided after Allied-Bruce46 – are no longer
valid. The FAA applies whether or not the parties
contemplated a transaction involving interstate
commerce when they entered their agreement.
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,47 illustrates the
extent of Congress’ authority under the Commerce
Clause. In Citizens Bank, the Supreme Court held
that the FAA applied to an arbitration clause in
contracts restructuring a commercial loan agreement
between a lender and a construction company
borrower. Although both the lender and the
construction company were Alabama residents, and
they had executed the restructuring agreements in
Alabama, the Court concluded that the parties’
transaction was “well within our previous
pronouncements on the extent of Congress’
Commerce Clause power.”48
According to the Court, the borrower was
engaged in business throughout the southeastern
United States using the restructured loans and had

also pledged its assets, including inventory assembled
from out of state parts, as security for the restructured
debt. These facts alone demonstrated that the
restructuring agreements evidenced a transaction
involving commerce.49 More importantly, even if the
particular restructuring agreements at issue had no
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the Court
emphasized that Congress was nevertheless entitled
to regulate commercial lending given that activity’s
“broad impact . . . on the national economy.”50 Thus,
because the parties’ transaction belonged to a class of
transactions (commercial lending) subject to
Congressional regulation, the FAA applied whether
or not the parties’ transaction itself had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.

Determining whether the FAA applies to
particular arbitration agreements
Given the extent of Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause, the FAA will apply to many –
perhaps most – arbitration agreements.51 Whether the
FAA applies to a particular agreement must be
decided on a case-by-case basis by the trial court.52
49. See id. The Court also rejected the analysis
conducted by the state Supreme Court, which had looked
for evidence that some of the restructured debt was
attributable to an interstate transaction, or that some of the
loan funds had originated from out of state, or that the
restructured debt was “inseparable from out of state
construction projects.” Id. at 56. While such evidence
might be necessary to prove that the parties’ transaction
occurred “in commerce” – i.e., “within the flow of
interstate commerce” – the FAA was not so limited. Id. at
56 (citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273).
50. Id. at 58.
51. See Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F.
Supp. 2d 555, 560 (M.D.N.C. 2004); DeLuca v. Bear
Stearns & Co.,175 F. Supp. 2d 102, 106 (D. Mass. 2001);
Snow v. BE & K Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D. Me.
2001).
52. See Eddings v. Southern Orthopedic and
Musculoskeletal Assocs., Inc., 356 N.C. 285, 569 S.E.2d
645 (2002) (adopting dissenting opinion in Eddings v.
Southern Orthopedic and Musculoskeletal Assocs., P.A.,
147 N.C. App. 375, 555 S.E.2d 649 (2001)); see also G.S.
§ 1-569.7 (upon motion to compel arbitration court shall
“proceed summarily to decide” whether there is an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate). The comments to the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act – enacted with some
modifications in North Carolina and applicable to
agreements to arbitrate made on or after January 1, 2004,
or by party consent to agreements made before that date,

“involving commerce” is broader than the term “in
commerce”).
44. Boynton v. ESC Med. Sys., Inc., 152 N.C. App.
103, 110, 566 S.E.2d 730, 734 (2002) (quotation omitted).
Other North Carolina cases applying the “contemplation of
the parties” test include Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. at
417, 279 S.E.2d at 822 (personal services contract that
“contemplates substantial interstate activity” is a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce), Paramore
v. Inter-Regional Financial Group Leasing Co., 68 N.C.
App. 659, 663, 316 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1984) (applying
“contemplation of the parties” test), and In re Cohoon, 60
N.C. App. 226, 229, 298 S.E.2d 729, 730-31 (1983) (same).
45. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277, 281.
46. See Boynton, 152 N.C. App. at 110, 566 S.E.2d at
734.
47. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (per curiam).
48. Id. at 57.
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Courts have consistently applied the FAA to
contracts bearing a relatively indirect relationship to
interstate commerce, including:
•

An agreement pursuant to which a North
Carolina resident agreed to act as exclusive
sales representative, in North Carolina and
South Carolina, for a Washington
corporation;53

•

Cash management and individual retirement
account agreements between customers and
their investment advisor;54

•

A dealer agreement under which plaintiffs
agreed to market defendant’s wireless
cellular communication services;55

•

An employment agreement between a
Tennessee physician and his North Carolina
employer, where the employer treated outof-state patients, received payments from
out-of-state insurance carriers, and
purchased supplies and services from out-ofstate; the employee had also moved from
Tennessee to begin work;56

•

national companies in the benefits review
process;57

An employment agreement between a health
care company and its medical director, when
the director participated in sales
presentations in multiple states, reviewed
proposals from out-of-state service
providers, and worked with officials from

•

Service agreements between a HMO and its
members, when the agreements
contemplated coverage when members were
out of state, many HMO providers were
recruited from out of state, and necessary
supplies and medical equipment were
shipped from out of state;58

•

A subcontract contemplating construction of
a gas pipeline within the state of New York,
when the parties were residents of different
states, materials and equipment used on the
project were from out of state, and the
pipeline was intended to connect to an
international pipeline;59

•

A breach of contract suit by a school board
against a multistate architectural firm;60 and

•

A franchise agreement between a North
Carolina franchisee and Florida franchisor,
where the franchisee received materials,
training, and advice from Florida and twice
attended the franchisor’s annual convention
there.61

Not every contract, of course, will evidence a
transaction involving interstate commerce.62
57. See Towles v. United HealthCare Corp., 524
S.E.2d 839 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999).
58. See Toledo v. Kaiser Permanente Med. Group, 987
F. Supp. 1174, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that FAA
governs if contract “has any effect on commerce”).
59. See St. Lawrence Explosives Corp. v. Worthy Bros.
Pipeline Corp., 916 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
(also stating that under FAA definition of commerce, “only
the slightest nexus between the contract and interstate
commerce is required”).
60. See Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d
816. Shaver Partnership predates the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Allied-Bruce and applies the “contemplation of
the parties” test later rejected by the Supreme Court. See
supra note 44. The result in Shaver Partnership, however,
would remain the same under Allied-Bruce.
61. See Szymczyk v. Signs Now Corp., 606 S.E.2d 728,
732 (2005).
62. See, e.g., Cecala v. Moore, 982 F. Supp. 609 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (real estate contract did not evidence transaction
involving interstate commerce where property and
plaintiffs were in Illinois, no transactions took place outside
Illinois, and only sellers were located outside Illinois;
however, Congress likely has the power to regulate local
real estate sales given that activity’s aggregate effect on

see G.S. § 1-569.3 – suggest that the court makes this
determination without a jury. See RUAA § 7, comment, 7
U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2002) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
ulc/ulc_frame.htm> (last checked August 11, 2005).
53. See Boynton, 152 N.C. App. 103, 566 S.E.2d 730.
As noted previously, supra n. 44, Boynton incorrectly states
the test for whether a contract evidences a transaction
involving commerce as whether “at the time [the parties]
entered into [the contract] and accepted the arbitration
clause, they contemplated substantial interstate activity.”
Id. at 110, 446 S.E.2d at 734 (quotation omitted). The
result in Boynton, however, is consistent with the more
expansive approach to FAA preemption taken by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
54. See Park v. Merrill Lynch, 159 N.C. App. 120, 582
S.E.2d 375 (2003).
55. See WMS, Inc. v. Weaver, 602 S.E.2d 706 (N.C.
App. 2004).
56. See Eddings v. Southern Orthopaedic and
Musculoskeleal Assocs., P.A., 605 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. App.
2004).
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Is the arbitration agreement contained in
the employment contract of a worker
engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce?

Nevertheless, if the transaction “evidenced” by a
particular agreement is one that Congress could
regulate under its Commerce Clause power, the FAA
will apply.63 And that power is substantial –
permitting regulation of purely intrastate commercial
activity, if, for example, that activity belongs to a
class of activities that, in the aggregate, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.64 North
Carolina cases limiting the FAA’s reach to
transactions that occur “in commerce,”65 or to
transactions that the parties “contemplated” would
involve interstate commerce,66 are no longer valid.67

Notwithstanding the FAA’s broad applicability,
section one excludes from the Act’s coverage
“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.”68 Although this
clause, like section 2, arguably represents an attempt
to exercise Congress’ Commerce Clause power in
full, thereby exempting nearly all employment
contracts from the FAA, the Supreme Court has held
that only transportation workers – i.e. workers who
are “engaged in transportation” – are exempt.69
Other than “seamen [and] railroad employees,”
what classes of worker are “engaged in
transportation?” Courts have interpreted section 1
narrowly, generally applying the exclusion “only [to]
those other classes of workers who are actually
engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign
commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to
be in practical effect part of it.”70 The following
cases are illustrative:

interstate commerce, so the result in Moore is arguably
incorrect); Paramore v. Inter-Regional Financial Group
Leasing Co., 68 N.C. App. 659, 316 S.E.2d 90 (1984)
(concluding that FAA did not apply to agreement under
which North Carolina plaintiffs leased tractor, for use in
North Carolina, from Minnesota corporation; lease was
solicited by corporation’s agent in North Carolina, and
plaintiffs picked up tractor from dealer in North Carolina
but sent payments to defendant’s Montana office. Note,
however, that Paramore applies the invalid “contemplation
of the parties” test and that its result arguably conflicts with
Citizens Bank, since Congress likely has the power to
regulate equipment leasing transactions, given that
activity’s aggregate effect on the national economy. See
539 U.S. at 58.).
63. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277.
64. Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56-57.
65. See Bryant-Durham Elec. Co., Inc., 42 N.C. App.
at 356, 256 S.E.2d at 532.
66. See supra n. 44.
67. In addition, some North Carolina cases state that
“importation into one state from another is the
indispensable element, the test, of interstate commerce.”
Szymczyk, 606 S.E.2d at 732 (2005) (quoting Snelling &
Snelling, Inc. v. Watson, 41 N.C. App. 193, 197-98, 254
S.E.2d 785, 789 (1979) (interpreting phrase “transacting
business in interstate commerce” then used in G.S. § 55131(b)(8), now G.S. § 55-15-01)). The Supreme Court’s
cases, however, reveal that the FAA may apply even if the
parties’ transaction does not involve the physical
movement of goods or people from one state to another. In
Citizens Bank, for example, the Court noted that the FAA
would govern an individual commercial loan transaction
even if the transaction itself had no substantial effect on
interstate commerce, because commercial loan activity, in
the aggregate, had such an effect. 539 U.S. at 56.

•

Section 1 did not exempt a guard employed
by a company responsible for security at
Union Station in Washington, D.C.71

•

Section 1 did not exempt warehouse worker
employed by manufacturing company, who
was responsible for receiving products from
out-of-state manufacturers and for
packaging and loading products for
shipment. Worker was engaged in interstate
commerce, but not in work substantially
similar to that performed by seamen or
railroad employees.72

68. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
69. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 121 (2001); Sillins v. Ness, 164 N.C. App. 755, 757,
596 S.E.2d 874, 876 (2004).
70. Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588,
593 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted); see also Cole v.
Burns Int’l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (§ 1 applies to only those workers involved in the
“‘flow’ of commerce, i.e., those workers responsible for the
transportation and distribution of goods”).
71. See Cole, 105 F.3d 1465.
72. See Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 859 F.
Supp. 952 (D. Md. 1994). But see Lenz v. Yellow Transp.,
Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906-07 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (noting
that worker in Kropfelder worked for manufacturing
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•

Section 1 did not exempt temporary
employees assigned to “manual day labor”
in various jobs, including construction,
landscaping, stevedoring, and warehousing,
among others. Although some assigned jobs
were “related to the interstate transportation
of goods,” there was no evidence that a
“majority or even a plurality of plaintiffs’
daily activities were in transportation-related
industries.”73

•

Section 1 exempted delivery driver who
contracted with courier service to provide
“small package information, transportation,
and delivery service throughout the United
States.”74

•

Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2005/05
Before turning to this topic, note that contract
parties may agree to apply state arbitration law to
their disputes. If they so agree – incorporating state
arbitration law into their contract – the FAA will not
preempt the incorporated law. The decision whether
a contract incorporates state arbitration law, however,
itself raises issues of FAA preemption. Indeed, in
some cases, the FAA may preempt a finding that a
contract incorporates state law. Thus, this bulletin
defers further discussion of this topic until after the
following discussion of the scope of FAA
preemption.

Does the FAA preempt the challenged
state law?
The Supreme Court has traced Congress’ power to
preempt state law to Article 6, clause 2 of the U.S.
Constitution (the “Supremacy Clause”).78 Whether a
given federal statute in fact preempts state law is a
matter of Congressional intent.
The courts have generally divided preemption
into two overarching categories: express and
implied. Courts use the term express preemption to
describe federal statutes that explicitly state their
intended preemptive effect.79 If the relevant federal
law contains no express preemption language, state
law may nevertheless be preempted by implication:
i.e., preempted because courts infer Congress’ intent
to preempt state law from the general statutory
scheme, “purpose,” or legislative history.
Courts further subdivide “implied preemption”
cases into two categories: “field preemption” and
“conflict preemption.” In field preemption cases,
courts infer an intent to preempt state law “from the
depth and breadth of a congressional scheme that
occupies the legislative field.”80 In such cases, courts

Section 1 exempted employee responsible
for directly supervising drivers who
transported packages for an interstate and
international shipping company.75

Because section 1 requires a relatively direct
connection between the worker and foreign or
interstate commerce, the exemption will not apply to
most contracts of employment,76 particularly those
involving workers outside the transportation
industries. If the exemption applies, however, state
law, not the FAA, will likely govern the
enforceability of any arbitration agreement.77

Have the parties contracted to apply state
law to their dispute?
Thus far, we have seen that the FAA requires
enforcement of written arbitration agreements in
contracts “evidencing a transaction involving
commerce,” other than employment contracts of
transportation workers. If it applies, the FAA will
preempt much state arbitration law. The following
sections of this bulletin discuss how courts should
analyze whether the FAA preempts particular state
laws.

78. See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001); Gade v. Nat'
l Solid Wastes Mgmt.
Ass'
n., 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); Chicago & N.W. Transp.
Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-318
(1981). Some scholars would instead locate any
Congressional preemption power in the Necessary and
Proper clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See, e.g.,
Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
Cornell L. Rev. 767 (1994).
79. See, e.g., Reilly, 533 U.S. at 541 (“State action
may be foreclosed by express language in a congressional
enactment.”). Congress may specify the extent to which
the federal enactment will preempt state law – e.g., whether
the federal law displaces all state regulation or only state
law that conflicts with the federal scheme. See, e.g.,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992).
80. Reilly, 533 U.S. at 541.

company, rather than for an employer in the transportation
industry).
73. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 499 &
505 (4th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
74. Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d
1137, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001).
75. See Palcko, 372 F.3d at 593 & 594 n.2.
76. See Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d at
560.
77. See Palcko, 372 F.3d at 596 (rejecting argument
that FAA preempted state law requiring arbitration under
contracts exempt under FAA § 1); see also Cole, 105 F.3d
at 1472.
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deem Congress to have prohibited all state regulation
in a particular field, whether or not state law conflicts
with federal law. Courts generally attribute such
broad preemptive intent to Congress only in areas of
dominant federal interest or where the federal statute
creates a “pervasive” regulatory scheme.81
In cases of “conflict preemption,” state law is
preempted “by implication because of a conflict with
a congressional enactment.”82 Such a conflict may
arise either because it is impossible to comply with
both state and federal law83 or because state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”84 This latter type of implied conflict
preemption is termed “obstacle preemption.”85

arbitration agreements and awards, not with minute
regulation of the arbitration process itself, and many
of the provisions are explicitly directed to federal, not
state, courts.88
To the extent the Supreme Court has articulated
a coherent FAA preemption theory, it is one of
implied conflict preemption.89 Under this theory,
state laws are preempted to the extent they “would
undermine the [pro-arbitration] goals and policies of
the FAA.”90 This policy is manifested most clearly
in FAA § 2. Because that section also contains the
most significant limitation on the scope of FAA
preemption, it merits extended discussion.

Under FAA § 2, state law “hostile” to
arbitration is preempted; generally
applicable state law is not.

FAA preemption is a form of obstacle
preemption.

FAA section 2 mandates that written arbitration
agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”91
Section 2 contains what might be termed the FAA’s
preemptive “core,”92 establishing a national policy
mandating enforcement of arbitration agreements
notwithstanding state law to the contrary.
This pro-arbitration mandate, however, is
tempered by section two’s “savings clause” which
permits courts to invalidate arbitration agreements
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”93 The savings clause
permits courts to apply “generally applicable

No provision of the FAA expressly states whether, or
to what extent, the Act preempts state law.86
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
FAA does not “reflect a congressional intent to
occupy the entire field of arbitration.”87 Indeed, the
structure of the Act itself suggests a role for state
arbitration law. The Act’s substantive provisions are
chiefly concerned with the enforceability of
81. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'
n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
82. Reilly, 533 U.S. at 541.
83. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (implied conflict preemption
occurs when “compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility”).
84. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
85. See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 398.
86. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
It is possible to read FAA § 2 as an express preemption
clause, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225,
299 (2000), although the Supreme Court has never adopted
this view. For a clear example of an express preemption
clause, consider the following provision of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a):
“Except as provided [elsewhere in] this section, the
provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan.”
87. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. But see Macneil et al.,
supra n. 20 § 10.8.2, at 10:76 (listing “strong arguments”
that the FAA, if it applies, should preempt all of state
arbitration law).

88. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (providing for stays of
judicial proceedings pending arbitration and for orders
compelling arbitration and referring to “courts of the
United States” and “United States district court[s]”); 9
U.S.C. §§ 9-13 (establishing procedures and grounds for
confirming, vacating, or modifying arbitral awards in
federal courts; referring, for example, to “United States
court[s]” and “United States district court[s]”); see also
Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 195, 200-01 (noting
incomplete FAA coverage and arguing for a state role in
regulating the process of arbitration).
89. See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 407.
90. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478.
91. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
92. Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 194-95; see
also Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 407 (“[S]tate laws [are]
preempted when they conflict with the dictate of § 2 that
arbitration agreements be ‘valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable.’”).
93. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
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contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability” to invalidate arbitration
agreements.94 Applying general contract law
principles to arbitration agreements is consistent with
the FAA’s goal of placing such agreements “upon the
same footing as other contracts.”95
“Courts may not, however, invalidate arbitration
agreements under state laws applicable only to
arbitration provisions.”96 Nor may courts invalidate
arbitration agreements under a “state-law principle
that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a
contract to arbitrate is at issue.”97 The Supreme
Court has admonished that:
A court may not . . . in assessing the rights
of litigants to enforce an arbitration
agreement, construe that agreement in a
manner different from that in which it
otherwise construes nonarbitration
agreements under state law. Nor may a
court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement
to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding
that enforcement would be
unconscionable.”98
Thus, the FAA requires courts to enforce
arbitration agreements and preempts state law that
would reach a contrary result, unless the relevant
state law is a “generally applicable” defense to
contract enforcement. The following section
discusses how these preemption principles apply in
particular cases.99

conflict with the FAA’s strong pro-arbitration
mandate, and they are preempted.
Examples of state laws hostile to arbitration
include:
•

Laws forbidding courts to order specific
performance of predispute arbitration
agreements.100

•

Laws requiring a judicial forum for certain
types of disputes, such as franchise
disputes101 or wage collection actions.102

•

Laws allowing courts, but not arbitrators, to
award punitive damages.103

•

Laws imposing on arbitration agreements
special rules of contract formation – such as
special “conspicuous notice” requirements –
not applicable to other contracts.104

•

Laws prohibiting “nonnnegotiable”
arbitration clauses while permitting other
types of “nonnegotiable” contract terms.105

Is the challenged state law “generally
applicable” contract law?
What about state laws that are not overtly hostile to
arbitration but that nevertheless deny enforcement to
an arbitration agreement? Under FAA section 2,
such laws are not preempted if they constitute
“grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract.”
Thus, a court may invalidate an arbitration
agreement, like any other contract, for lack of
consideration, or because a party’s agreement to
arbitrate was induced by fraud, or because a contract
signatory lacked authority to bind a party to the
contract.106 Likewise, an arbitration agreement may

Is state law hostile to arbitration?
The clearest case of FAA preemption involves state
law that is hostile to arbitration. For example, the
FAA indisputably preempts state laws that declare
arbitration agreements invalid. The same is true of
laws that single out arbitration agreements for
special, unfavorable treatment, or that impose special
limitations on the authority of arbitrators. These laws

100. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 269.
101. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 5-6 & 16.
102. See Perry, 482 U.S. 483.
103. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson/Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (unless the parties agreed
otherwise, the FAA would preempt a state law rule
forbidding arbitral awards of punitive damages).
104. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683 (holding that the
FAA preempted a Montana statute requiring arbitration
clauses to be contained in a “Notice of Arbitration” typed
in underlined capital letters on the front of the contract).
105. See Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905
F.2d 719, 725-26 (4th Cir. 1990).
106. See, e.g., Martin v. Vance, 133 N.C. App. 116,
122, 514 S.E.2d 306, 310 (1999) (considering whether
arbitration agreement was supported by consideration);
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.

94. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
687 (1996) (emphasis added).
95. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24; Volt, 489 U.S. at 474.
96. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
97. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
98. Id.
99. Readers should be aware that arbitrators, and not
courts, must decide many challenges to the enforceability
of contracts that contain arbitration clauses. This bulletin
does not address whether courts or arbitrators should decide
particular challenges. That topic will be addressed in a
separate bulletin.
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be invalidated under the doctrine of
unconscionability.107 The FAA does not preempt
such “generally applicable” state law.
The Supreme Court, however, has made clear
that courts may not apply state law principles that
take their meaning “precisely from the fact that a
contract to arbitrate is at issue.”108 So, for example,
the FAA would preempt a judicially-crafted state law
invalidating as unconscionable all consumer
arbitration agreements.109 The FAA would also
preempt even “generally applicable” state law if
applied in a manner hostile to arbitration. For
example, a court could not invalidate an arbitration
agreement under a duress or fraud in the inducement
theory, when the same contract, without the
arbitration clause, would be enforced.110 The guiding

principle is one of neutrality: both the substantive
law and the court’s application of that law must be
consistent with the FAA’s requirement that
arbitration agreements be placed “upon the same
footing as other contracts.”111

Laws that are not “generally applicable”
A final category consists of laws that are not
“generally applicable” but that also are not overtly
hostile to arbitration. As an example, consider laws
regulating or facilitating the arbitration process – say,
by establishing procedures governing pre-hearing
discovery. Are such laws preempted?
The case law provides relatively little guidance
as to how courts should address such preemption
issues.112 Recall, however, that the Supreme Court’s
preemption theory is one of implied obstacle
preemption: state laws are preempted if they
“undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”113
The FAA’s principal purpose is to ensure that
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms.114 State laws that regulate the arbitration
process are likely consistent with this purpose, unless
they invalidate the parties’ agreement, nullify its
terms, or otherwise operate in a manner “hostile” to
arbitration.115
For example, the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act (RUAA), enacted with limited changes in North
Carolina, regulates numerous aspects of the
arbitration process not explicitly addressed by the
FAA.116 The RUAA addresses, among other topics,
disclosure of information by arbitrators, arbitral
discovery and hearing procedures, and arbitrator
immunity.117 While this bulletin does not attempt to

395 (1967) (court, rather than arbitrator, decides whether
arbitration agreement was fraudulently induced); Sphere
Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 592
(7th Cir. 2001) (remanding for decision as to whether
contract signatory was authorized to bind party).
107. Unconscionability is a state law “policing
doctrine” used by courts to limit the enforceability of
contracts perceived to be unfair. The doctrine is recognized
in North Carolina. See G.S. 25-2-302; Brenner v. Little
Red School House, Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 213-14, 274 S.E.2d
206, 210-11 (1981); Sidden v. Mailman, 137 N.C. App.
669, 675, 529 S.E.2d 266, 271(2000). For detailed
discussion of the use of unconscionability doctrine in
policing arbitration agreements, see Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight
to Arbitration Formalism, 19 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 757
(2004).
Note that there may be some circumstances under
which arbitrators, and not courts, must decide whether an
arbitration clause is unconscionable. Compare Hawkins v.
Aid Ass'
n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2003)
(arbitrator, not court, must decide whether contract
provisions barring punitive damages and classwide
arbitration were unconscionable) with Ingle v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170-73, 1175-76 (9th Cir.
2003) (addressing whether waiver of right to proceed as
class rendered arbitration provision unconscionable).
Whether courts or arbitrators must decide particular issues
will be covered in more detail in a separate bulletin.
108. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
109. See id. (“Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness
of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.”).
110. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281 (“What States
may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to

enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not
fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.”).
111. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
112. For a summary of possible approaches, see
Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 416-20.
113. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478.
114. See id.
115. For a contrary view arguing that the FAA
preempts all state arbitration law when it applies, see
MacNeil et al., supra n. 20 § 10.8.2.2, at 10:76.
116. See G.S. § 1-569.1 et seq.; 7 U.L.A. 1 et seq.
[herein RUAA § __]. The RUAA applies to agreements to
arbitrate made after January 1, 2004, and to prior
agreements if the parties so agree “in a record.” G.S. § 1569.3.
117. See G.S. § 1-569.1 et seq. The RUAA also
addresses issues covered more directly by the FAA,
including the enforceability of arbitration agreements, the
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evaluate each RUAA provision for compatibility with
the FAA, most RUAA provisions are likely to
survive an obstacle preemption analysis.118 Courts
faced with preemption challenges to state law that is
not “generally applicable” must determine whether
the law is consistent with the FAA or, rather, whether
it undermines the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate.

vacatur standards, it would have found little
difference from those set out in the FAA.125
Laws forbidding out-of-state forum selection
clauses: G.S. § 22B-3 invalidates forum selection
clauses, in contracts entered into in North Carolina,
requiring contract parties to litigate or arbitrate their
disputes outside of North Carolina.126 Although the
statute invalidates out-of-state forum selection
clauses regardless whether the contract at issue
requires arbitration, and therefore does not apply
“only to arbitration provisions,”127 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals has held that it is preempted.128 A
number of other courts have reached similar
conclusions with respect to other statutes.129
To understand these cases, return to the language
of the FAA section 2 savings clause: arbitration
agreements must be enforced “save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.”130 The relevant preemption cases
involve statutes that invalidate out-of-state forum
selection clauses in franchise agreements, but not in
other contracts.131 Because such statutes apply only

Specific North Carolina preemption issues
A number of cases have addressed FAA
preemption of North Carolina law. The following
section discusses these cases and identifies other
aspects of North Carolina law that may raise
preemption issues.
Judicial review of arbitral awards: In WMS, Inc.
v. Weaver,119 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
stated that the FAA preempts “state law addressing
the role of courts in reviewing arbitration awards.”120
In deciding whether to confirm or vacate an arbitral
award, the Court of Appeals therefore looked to the
standards governing vacatur in 9 U.S.C. § 10, rather
than those now contained in G.S. § 1-569.23.121
By its express terms, FAA section 10 is directed
to federal, not state, courts: the statute governs
vacatur of arbitral awards by “the United States
court” in the district where the arbitral award was
made.122 Arguably, states retain the freedom to
establish their own standards for vacatur of arbitral
awards, subject to the usual qualification that state
law must not “undermine the goals and policies of the
FAA.”123 Concerns about preemption, however,
apparently led the drafters of the RUAA to adhere
closely to the vacatur standards specified in the
FAA.124 As a result, had the Court of Appeals in
Weaver looked to state law to determine the relevant

125. Compare G.S. §§ 1-569.22-25 (current N.C.
arbitration statute) with 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11. See also Hayford
& Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 218-19.
126. G.S. § 22B-3 provides: “Except as otherwise
provided in this section, any provision in a contract entered
into in North Carolina that requires the prosecution of any
action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the
contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against
public policy and is void and unenforceable. This
prohibition shall not apply to non-consumer loan
transactions or to any action or arbitration of a dispute that
is commenced in another state pursuant to a forum
selection provision with the consent of all parties to the
contract at the time that the dispute arises.”
127. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
128. Boynton, 152 N.C. App. at 109, 566 S.E.2d at
734.
129. See Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d
884 (9th Cir. 2001) (similar statute applicable to franchise
agreements); KKW Enters, Inc. v. Gloria Jean'
s Gourmet
Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999)
(same); Doctor'
s Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157
(2d Cir. 1998) (same); see also See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at
409-410 (arguing that Southland supports preemption of
such statutes). But see Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp.,
971 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Mont. 1998) (holding that FAA did
not preempt Montana statute invalidating contract terms
requiring state residents to resolve disputes out of state).
130. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
131. See Bradley, 275 F.3d 884; KKW Enters, 184
F.3d 42; Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157.

arbitrability of disputes, and the processes for confirming,
modifying, and vacating arbitral awards. On these matters,
the RUAA adheres closely to the FAA, recognizing that
they fall within the “core” areas of FAA preemption. See
Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 213-226.
118. For thorough treatment of whether the FAA
preempts state law that, like the RUAA, regulates the
arbitration process itself, see Hayford & Palmiter, supra n.
15, and Drahozal, supra n. 6.
119. 602 S.E.2d 706 (N.C. App. 2004).
120. Id. at 710.
121. See id.
122. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
123. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478.
124. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 219.
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to a limited subset of contracts, rather than to
“contracts generally,”132 courts have found them
preempted.133
G.S. § 22B-3 presents a closer call. Unlike a
state franchise act, § 22B-3 does not single out a
particular type of contract for regulation. But neither
does it apply to any contract; there are narrow
exceptions. The principal exception is for nonconsumer loan transactions.134 Moreover, G.S. §
22B-3 invalidates only the out-of-state forum
selection clause, potentially allowing the court to
enforce the remainder of the arbitration agreement.135
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has determined
that the FAA preempts § 22B-3.136
Laws requiring the parties specifically to
authorize arbitral awards of punitive damages: One

produced at the hearing justifies the award under the legal
standards otherwise applicable to the claim. The model
RUAA does not contain the first of these three
requirements.137

G.S. § 1-569.21 may be vulnerable to a
preemption challenge. In Mastrobuono v.
Shearson/Lehman Hutton, Inc.,138 discussed in more
detail in the following section, the U.S. Supreme
Court indicated that the FAA preempts state law
allowing courts, but not arbitrators, to award punitive
damages.139 Thus, “state law cannot prohibit the
arbitrability of a claim for punitive damages.”140
This limitation on state law is unsurprising, given the
FAA’s goal of eliminating state law hostile to
arbitration.141
Unlike the state-law rule in Mastrobuono, G.S. §
1-569.21 does permit arbitral awards of punitive
damages if “provide[d] for” in the parties’ agreement.
What does this mean? Conceivably, G.S. § 1-569.21
might be interpreted to allow punitive damages
whenever such awards are consistent with the parties’
agreement. Because courts interpreting agreements
subject to the FAA must resolve “any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitral issues . . . in favor of
arbitration,”142 and because “arbitrators
presumptively enjoy the power to award punitive
damages,”143 G.S. § 1-569.21 might permit such
awards unless “the arbitration contract unequivocally
excludes punitive damages claims.”144 Such an
interpretation would pose no preemption issue, as
parties are free to arbitrate whatever issues they wish
(though state law may limit the ability to waive the
right to recover punitive damages altogether).
But interpreting the phrase “provides for” to
mean “does not expressly exclude” arguably strips
the phrase of its meaning. Instead, G.S. § 1-569.21
might be interpreted, more plausibly, to bar arbitral
awards of punitive damages unless the parties
specifically grant the arbitrators that authority. So
interpreted, G.S. § 1-569.21 would presumptively

area in which North Carolina arbitration law departs from
the model RUAA relates to arbitrators’ authority to award
punitive damages or “other exemplary relief.” G.S. § 1569.21 allows such awards if (1) the arbitration agreement
“provides for an award of punitive damages or exemplary
relief”; (2) an award of such relief is authorized by law in a
civil action involving the same claim, and (3) the evidence
132. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
133. See Bradley, 275 F.3d at 889-90; KKW Enters,
184 F.3d at 51; Hamilton, 150 F.3d at 163.
134. Other exceptions are for contracts entered into in
other states (though this exception is of little practical
consequence, as North Carolina law typically would not
apply to such contracts, see Walden v. Vaugn, 157 N.C.
App. 507, 510, 579 S.E.2d 475, 477 (2003)) and for postdispute agreements to arbitrate. See G.S. § 22B-3.
135. Cf. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d at 1245-46
(Montana statutes invalidating out-of-state forum clauses
did not “nullif[y] either party’s obligation to arbitrate”).
Note, however, that state law invalidating particular
arbitration-related terms, while otherwise allowing
arbitration to go forward, might still be preempted under
the theory that the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration
agreements “according to their terms.” Cf. Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (advancing this
argument with respect to arbitration agreement that, in
dissent’s view, unambiguously barred classwide arbitration
proceedings).
136. See Boynton, 152 N.C. App. at 109, 566 S.E.2d at
734; see also Szymczyk, 606 S.E.2d at 732. Even if the
FAA preempts statutes like G.S. § 22B-3, courts may be
willing to consider the effect of a forum selection clause
when analyzing an arbitration agreement under
unconscionability doctrine. See, e.g., Patterson v. ITT
Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565-67 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1993).

137. See RUAA § 21(a).
138. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
139. See id. at 59 (unless the parties intended to
exclude punitive damages claims from arbitration, the FAA
would preempt state law forbidding arbitral awards of
punitive damages).
140. Hayford & Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 214.
141. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
142. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
143. Weaver, 602 S.E.2d at 711 (quotation omitted).
144. Id. (discussing Mastrobuono in a case governed
by N.C. law before enactment of G.S. § 1-569.21)
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exclude some claims from arbitration145 and withhold
from arbitrators a remedial power routinely exercised
by courts. Such presumptions would be difficult to
square with Mastrobuono.146
State law governing whether courts or arbitrators
decide particular questions: Parties to arbitration
agreements often disagree on a fundamental
procedural question: whether the court or the
arbitrator should decide an issue. For example,
assume that Party A wants to rescind a contract (say,
a consulting agreement) containing an arbitration
clause, claiming that Party B obtained A’s agreement
by falsely representing B’s ability to perform the
required consulting services. Party A wants a court
to decide the rescission issue, arguing that A cannot
be compelled to arbitrate anything if the entire
contract is unenforceable. Unfortunately for A, its
argument will almost certainly fail. As a matter of
federal arbitration law, the arbitrator must decide
whether A may rescind the contract, unless the
parties’ agreement says otherwise.147
This procedural question – who decides a
particular issue – will be discussed in a separate
bulletin. An extensive (if confused) body of FAA
law has developed on this topic. For purposes of this
bulletin, however, readers should be aware that “[i]f
the FAA requires that a particular question be
determined by the arbitrators, while state law would
allow a court to address the issue, the FAA
controls.”148

State law requiring “independent negotiation” of
arbitration clauses: Some North Carolina cases state
that arbitration agreements, “if contained in a
contract covering other topics, must be independently
negotiated.”149 Sometimes these statements appear in
cases clearly governed by the FAA,150 and at least
one case purports to trace this “independent
negotiation” requirement to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Southland.151
Nothing in Southland, however, requires
“independent negotiation” of arbitration clauses, and
Supreme Court cases since Southland have
consistently enforced arbitration agreements in
circumstances where there was clearly no
independent negotiation.152 Moreover, it is difficult
to see how an “independent negotiation” requirement
can be squared with the rule that state law may not
impose more stringent contract formation
requirements on arbitration agreements than on other
types of contracts.153 If the FAA applies, a court may
not condition enforcement of the arbitration
agreement on proof that the agreement was
“independently negotiated,” at least where state law
does not require independent negotiation of all
contract terms.154

149. Routh v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 108 N.C. App.
268, 272, 423 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1992); see also Blow v.
Shaughnessy, 68 N.C. App. 1, 16-17, 313 S.E.2d 868, 87677 (1984); Sciolino v. TD Waterhouse Investor Servs., Inc.,
149 N.C. App. 642, 645, 562 S.E.2d 64, 66 (2002) (noting
cases suggesting such a requirement).
150. See, e.g., Blow, 68 N.C. App. 1, 313 S.E.2d 868.
151. See id. at 16-17, 313 S.E.2d at 876-77.
152. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. 105 (FAA
compelled arbitration of employee’s discrimination claims
pursuant to clause in employment application form used by
national retailer); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265 (FAA
preempted state law invalidating pre-dispute arbitration
clause in consumer transaction involving termite control
services); Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (FAA compelled arbitration
of federal age discrimination claims brought by registered
securities representative; such persons are required to agree
to arbitration as a condition of registration with the relevant
stock exchange).
153. See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687; see also
Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
154. See Saturn Distrib. Corp., 905 F.2d at 725-26
(FAA preempts state law forbidding “nonnegotiable”
arbitration clauses but not other “nonnegotiable” terms).

145. For example, assume the parties validly agreed to
arbitrate “any and all claims arising out of or related to”
their contract, but said nothing about punitive damages, and
that one party thereafter filed a lawsuit alleging breach of
contract and fraud claims. Cf. Eddings, 605 S.E.2d at 682.
The defendant would clearly be entitled to have the breach
of contract claim referred to arbitration, but G.S. § 1569.21 might preserve a judicial forum for the fraud claim
(or, more likely, for punitive damages issues related to that
claim).
146. “Under Mastrobuono, an arbitrator does not
exceed his powers if (1) state law allows the remedy for the
specified cause of action, and (2) the arbitration contract
does not unequivocally preclude it.” Weaver, 602 S.E.2d
at 711.
147. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (unless the parties
agree otherwise, arbitrator decides claim that entire contract
was induced by fraud, court decides claim that arbitration
clause itself was induced by fraud).
148. Weaver, 602 S.E.2d at 710.
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Have the parties chosen to apply state
arbitration law?

defendants who were involved in the construction
project but who had not agreed to arbitrate. The
contractor petitioned the trial court to compel
arbitration.
Although the FAA arguably would have required
the trial court to stay litigation and compel
arbitration,160 the trial court instead stayed the
arbitration pursuant to a California statute authorizing
such stays pending litigation between third parties
and a party to the arbitration agreement. The court
reached this result by interpreting the choice of law
clause to incorporate California substantive law and
California arbitration law, and the state appellate
courts upheld this ruling.161
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. According to
the Court, while the FAA preempts state law
requiring a judicial forum for claims the parties have
agreed to arbitrate, “it does not follow that the FAA
prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
under different rules than those set forth in the [FAA]
itself.”162 Deferring to the state courts’ contract
interpretation, the Court explained that the parties
had “agreed to arbitrate in accordance with California
law,”163 including “state rules of arbitration.”164 The
Court then asked whether applying California law to
stay arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the
arbitration agreement itself, would undermine the
goals and policies of the FAA.”165 It concluded that
enforcing the parties’ agreement “is fully consistent
with the goals of the FAA even if the result is that

Previously, this bulletin noted that contract parties
may agree to apply state arbitration law to their
disputes.155 That they may do so reflects the
contractual nature of arbitration.156 Like other
contracts, “parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit.”157 Thus,
parties to arbitration agreements may exclude
particular issues from arbitration, establish
procedures to govern their arbitration, or agree to
apply state arbitration law to their dispute. Whatever
their agreement, the FAA requires courts to enforce
it, subject, of course, to “generally applicable” state
law governing all contracts.
If an arbitration agreement otherwise subject to
the FAA expressly incorporates state arbitration law,
the result is simple: state arbitration law applies
without any concerns about FAA preemption. More
commonly, however, a contract will contain a generic
choice of law clause such as the following: “This
agreement shall be governed and construed in
accordance with the law of the State of North
Carolina, irrespective of its choice of law rules.”
Does a generic choice of law clause implicitly
incorporate state arbitration law, even though the
FAA would otherwise preempt that law? For
example, would a generic choice of law clause
implicitly incorporate G.S. § 1-569.21, which bars
arbitral awards of punitive damages unless the
agreement “provides for” such awards, even though
the FAA might otherwise preempt this aspect of
North Carolina law?
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases are relevant to
this question. The first is Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford
Junior University.158 Volt involved a contract
between a California university and a construction
contractor. The contract contained an arbitration
clause and also provided that the “law of the place
where the Project is located” would govern any
disputes.159 The university sued the contractor in
California state court, joining two additional

160. See id. at 476-77 & n.6; Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26-27 & n. 3435 (1983).
161. Volt, 489 U.S. at 471-73.
162. Id. at 478-79.
163. Id. at 477.
164. Id. at 479. Somewhat oddly, the majority opinion
in Volt construed the California arbitration rules to
“generally foster the federal policy favoring arbitration” by
addressing “special practical problems that arise in
multiparty contractual disputes,” a topic not addressed by
the FAA. Id. at 476 n.5. This seems rather dubious, as the
effect of the relevant state law was to prevent, or at least
delay, arbitration where it would otherwise have gone
forward. Moreover, the Court’s preemption analysis makes
little sense unless one presumes that the FAA would have
preempted the state law at issue but for the choice of law
clause. See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 406. But see Hayford
& Palmiter, supra n. 15 at 197 (Volt is consistent with
Court’s general approach “not to invalidate state law
merely because it may offend some general and abstractlyframed federal purpose, such as to promote arbitration”).
165. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78.

155. See supra p. 9.
156. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf
Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (“For arbitration is a
matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit.”).
157. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
158. 489 U.S. 468.
159. Id. at 470.
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arbitration is stayed where the [FAA] would
otherwise permit it to go forward.”166
Volt raised a prospect at odds with the Court’s
otherwise expansive FAA preemption jurisprudence:
that courts could interpret generic choice of law
provisions broadly to incorporate state arbitration
law, thus saving from preemption a host of state laws
hostile to arbitration.167 But the Court subsequently
limited this aspect of Volt in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson/Lehman Hutton, Inc.168
In Mastrobuono, the Court held that a panel of
arbitrators had properly awarded punitive damages
even though New York law, which governed the
parties’ dispute pursuant to a generic choice of law
provision, allowed courts but not arbitrators to award
such damages. The Court first made clear that,
unless the parties intended to exclude punitive
damages claims from arbitration, the FAA would
preempt New York law forbidding an arbitral award
of punitive damages.169 Examining their agreement
for evidence of such an intent, the Court reasoned
that the choice of law clause was ambiguous: “the
provision might include only New York’s substantive
rights and obligations, and not the State’s allocation
of power between” courts and arbitrators.170
The Court resolved this ambiguity by construing
the agreement to permit an arbitral award of punitive
damages, emphasizing that, when interpreting a
contract subject to the FAA, “‘due regard must be
given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and
ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause
itself resolved in favor of arbitration.’”171 Although
the generic choice of law clause at issue in Volt had
been similarly ambiguous, the Court distinguished
Volt as a case in which it had deferred to a state
court’s construction of an arbitration agreement
under state law.172
At a minimum, Mastrobuono cautions courts
against interpreting generic choice of law provisions
to incorporate state law hostile to arbitration.
According to the North Carolina Court of Appeals,

after Mastrobuono “a state choice of law clause in an
arbitration agreement should not be construed to limit
the authority of arbitrators.”173
In summary, contract parties may choose to
apply whatever law they wish to their arbitration
agreement, even if the FAA might otherwise preempt
the chosen law. Where the contract expressly
chooses state arbitration law, courts should have little
trouble enforcing it. But ambiguous contract
language should not be interpreted to incorporate
state law that is hostile to arbitration.174

Conclusion
Arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract, and
the FAA’s primary goal is to ensure that arbitration
agreements are treated as any other contract. But
determining when the FAA applies, and whether it
preempts particular state laws, is not always a simple
inquiry. This bulletin has attempted to identify the
analytical steps courts should take in addressing
issues of FAA preemption. The following page
contains a diagram of these steps, along with
references to the relevant sections of the bulletin.

166. Id. at 479.
167. See Drahozal, supra n. 6 at 406.
168. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
169. See id. at 59.
170. Id. at 60.
171. Id. at 62 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476). The
Court also invoked the rule that ambiguous contract terms
are construed against their drafter (in Mastrobuono, the
party trying to overturn the arbitral award). See id. at 62-3.
172. See id. at 60 n.4. By contrast, Mastrobuono
involved a motion to vacate the arbitral award filed in
federal court.

173. Lorelli, 607 S.E.2d at 677 (N.C. App. 2005).
174. See Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142
F.3d 926, 937 (6th Cir. 1998) (asking whether state law is
“consistent with the primary purpose of the FAA, i.e., to
ensure that the agreement to arbitrate . . . is enforced
according to its terms”).
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Preemption analysis
Is there a written arbitration provision in a maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce? (pp. 4-8)
- Ask whether Congress could regulate the transaction under the Commerce Clause.
Does the transaction involve channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce
(or persons or things in interstate commerce)? Is the transaction one of a class of
activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce? If yes, Congress could
regulate the transaction even if it is purely intrastate and even if the transaction
itself had no effect on interstate commerce.
-There is no requirement that the transaction be “in commerce.”
-There is no requirement that the parties have “contemplated” a transaction
involving interstate commerce.

No

FAA does
not apply

Yes
Is the arbitration provision in an employment contract of a worker engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce? (pp. 8-9)

Yes

FAA does
not apply

No
Have the parties agreed to apply state law to their dispute? (pp. 9, 16-17) Ambiguous
contract language generally should not be construed to limit arbitrator authority.

Yes

State law NOT
preempted

No
Is the challenged state law one that applies to contracts generally? (pp. 10-13)

Yes

State law NOT
preempted

No
Is the challenged law hostile to arbitration? (pp. 10-13) For example, does it single out
arbitration clauses for unfavorable treatment, invalidate the arbitration clause, exclude issues
or claims from arbitration, or impose limits on arbitrator authority not placed on courts?

Yes

State law
PREEMPTED

No
Is the state law an obstacle to accomplishing the FAA’s goals? (pp. 10-13) These include
placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts and ensuring that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms. For example, neutral
regulations of the arbitral process are likely consistent with the FAA.

Yes

State law
PREEMPTED

No
State law NOT preempted
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